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Abstract
Theory predicts that the presence of fixed costs affects the relationship between energy use
and energy price changes, as the firm’s output and investment decisions respond differently to
energy price increases and decreases. The asymmetry in response to energy price changes is
exacerbated by uncertainty with respect to future energy prices, but to date the empirical
literature does not explicitly take uncertainty into account. The contribution of this paper is
twofold. First, we develop a new measure of energy price uncertainty. Second, we apply the
measure to explain energy use in 8 OECD countries between 1978 and 1996, trying to
identify whether indeed energy price uncertainty effects the asymmetry resulting from
changes in energy use.
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1. Introduction
The recent literature on the effects of changing energy prices for investment and GDP growth
predicts that investment behaviour reacts asymmetrically to energy price increases and price
decreases. This asymmetry is caused by irreversibility of investment decisions. If new
technologies are being adopted in response to a change in energy prices, one does not expect
the firm to undo the investment if the energy price change is reversed.
In addition, theory predicts that uncertainty about future energy prices renders
investment behavior even more sluggish. The argument is that higher energy price uncertainty
increases the likelihood of such energy price reversals taking place, and hence induces firms
to postpone the adoption of new capital goods. In fact, when facing uncertainty, firms should
use an adoption criterion that is more stringent than standard expected net present value
analysis, because waiting for new information to arrive over time reduces the probability of
the investment turning out to be ex-post unprofitable (see Bernanke 1983, Pindyck 1991,
Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Thus, theory predicts that higher energy price uncertainty implies
that firms will not respond immediately to energy price increases; but if they have responded,
energy prices will have to fall substantially before the investment is reversed.
By now there is a substantial empirical literature that supports the theoretical prediction
with respect to the fundamental asymmetry in response of energy use to energy price
increases and decreases, both at the micro and macro level. Examples are Gately (1992),
Dargay and Gately (1994), Ferderer (1996), Hooker (1997, 2002), Balke et al. (2002),
Hamilton (2003), and Hamilton and Herrera (2003). With the notable exception of Ferderer
(1996), none of the papers above explicitly analyses the role of uncertainty in the asymmetry.
However, our measure of uncertainty differs from the one used by Ferderer. This difference
will be addressed in more detail in the next section.2
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by exploring the importance of energy
price uncertainty on the actual amount of energy used. The policy relevance of this research
question is evident, as it (i) helps identify economic circumstances under which policies
aimed at reducing energy use (for example because of environmental considerations as part of
the Kyoto Protocol) are likely to be more effective, and (ii) broadens the scope of possible
policy instruments to include instruments aimed at reducing uncertainty (cf. Dosi and Moretto
1997). We will address this issue by using data on 8 OECD countries over the period 1978-
1996.
The setup of this paper is as follows. The next section argues that a proper measure of
uncertainty takes account of volatility clustering. AutoRegressive Conditional
Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models are designed to do just that. Section 3 briefly explains the
class of ARCH models. In section 4, we estimate an ARCH model using monthly data. As far
as the question of model selection is concerned we follow Engle and Patton (2001). Section 5
presents our measure of uncertainty based on the conditional variances from the Generalized
ARCH (or GARCH) model. The volatility series have to be transformed to yearly data (see
also Bollerslev et al., 1994, p. 3012) to be used as inputs in models for which only yearly data
are available. This uncertainty measure is then exploited in section 6 in models that relate oil
prices to economic activity. It is shown that this relationship is asymmetric, with the
asymmetry depending on uncertainty. Section 7 discusses the implications of uncertainty for
energy use. Section 8 summarizes our main findings.
2. Measuring uncertainty
Before we address the importance of energy price uncertainty on energy use, however, we
need first to discuss how uncertainty should be measured. Ferderer (1996) measures oil price
uncertainty as the within-month standard deviation of daily oil prices. However, in many
economic time series applications there is reason to believe that the variance of the error term3
varies over time with the volatility of errors in the past. This clustering of large and small
errors may be observed for exchange rates, stock rate returns, interest rates, irreversible
investments and option pricing. And, when looking at monthly refiner acquisition cost of
imported crude oil (US$ per barrel)
1, we see that oil price changes are not likely to be an
exception: volatility clustering also occurs in oil price changes as is confirmed more formally
in the next section.
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This means that when confronted with the decision to adopt a new technology in response to
changes in oil prices, the entrepreneur should take into account that the high current levels of
volatility may result in energy price changes that render the investment ex-post unprofitable,
and that this probability of this event is likely to remain high for a fairly long period in the
foreseeable future. Therefore, we propose to construct a measure based on the conditional
standard deviation (as derived from univariate GARCH models), which takes volatility
clustering into account.
One of the purposes of this paper is to apply our uncertainty measure to data on energy
use. Consistent industry-level data are available for 8 OECD over roughly the period 1978-
1996, but only on a yearly basis. However, information about oil prices is available with a
higher frequency, such as on monthly or even daily basis. That means that we need to
translate oil price volatility as measured based on these higher frequency series into an annual
uncertainty measure. We will address this issue in section 5. In addition, with respect to the
choice of whether daily or monthly data should be used, daily oil price data have the
advantage of a larger number of observations, and hence allow for a more thorough testing of
1 Appendix A presents the source of the data.4
the importance of lags in determining variances. Unfortunately, the most often used time
series on oil prices, the Brent crude, only goes back up to January 5, 1982. Therefore, we will
apply our volatility measure on monthly data that captures a longer time span and use this
measure to explain energy use.
3. Accounting for volatility clustering
Figure 1 suggests that oil prices exhibit volatility clustering just by eyeballing the data. Here,
we take a formal approach by exploring some summary statistics of the monthly oil price
data.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Table 1 shows that the average percentage change in oil prices is about zero with a standard
deviation of 0.107. The log-differenced oil prices are asymmetrically distributed and the
lower tail of the distribution is thicker than the upper tail (negative skewedness), and the tails
of the distribution are thicker than in case of a normal distribution (kurtosis coefficient>3).
Autocorrelations of the log-differenced oil prices and of the squared log-differenced oil prices
suggests dependence in the mean (only a few significant lags) and some dependence in the
volatility (see Table 2).
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE5
The implication of volatility clustering is that volatility shocks today influence the expectation
of volatility many periods in the future.
2 From an econometric point of view, neglecting the
exact nature of the dependence of the variance of the error term conditional on past volatility
results in loss of efficiency. ARCH models are developed to model time-varying conditional
variances (see Engle 1982, Bollerslev et al. 1994). Given our main objective, the analysis of
the impact of energy price volatility on the relationship between energy use and energy price
changes, we need to establish (i) whether indeed volatility is serially correlated over time, and
(ii) whether asymmetries are present in the relationship of volatility over time.
To start with the first, various versions of Generalized ARCH models can be used to
determine whether the variance of an error term depends on past volatility (Bollerslev, 1986).
Defining
2
t ε as the variance of the error term of the following regression equation
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where . 0 , 0 , 0 0 ≥ ≥ > j i λ α α Here, the conditional variance may depend on q lags of
unconditional variances (squared innovations) and p lags of the conditional variance terms.
This model is referred to as a GARCH(p,q).
The simplest GARCH model is the GARCH(1,1) model that provides a good
description of the data in many applications. The error variance depends on all past volatilities
with geometrically declining weights as long as 1 1 < λ . Well-defined conditional variances
2 Appendix A lists some major political and economic factors that have influenced the oil
market and the oil prices.6
require that the parameters , , 1 0 α α and 1 λ are non-negative. In practice, the estimate for
1 1 ˆ ˆ λ α + in the GARCH(1,1) model is often close to unity, which means that the model is not
covariance stationary (the process is an integrated GARCH process). In that case the model
can be used only to describe short-term volatility.
Note that in the symmetric model (equation 2) the conditional variance is a function of
the size and not of the sign of lagged residuals. One way to allow for asymmetries is the
Threshold GARCH (TARCH) model (see Glosten et al., 1993; Zakoian, 1994):
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where 1 = t δ if 0 < t ε , and 0 otherwise. The coefficient γ measures the leverage effect. In this
model, good news ( 0 < t ε ) and bad news ( 0 > t ε ) have different effects on the conditional
variance. Good news has an impact of 1 α , while bad news has an impact of γ α + 1 .
An alternative model that allows for asymmetric shocks to volatility is the Exponential
GARCH (EGARCH) model (see Nelson, 1991) :
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The coefficients i γ measure the leverage effects. In the next section, we test whether leverage
effects are present in time series for oil prices.
4. Estimation results
We apply the GARCH(p,q) model to the log-differenced monthly oil price (see Figure 1
above) rather than to the actual price level as the latter is not found to be stationary.
3
3 For this longer span, unit-root tests (including a constant, no trend and 4 lags) do not reject
the hypothesis of a unit root at 5%. The ADF test statistic equals -2.204 which, in absolute
value, is smaller than the 5% critical value (–2.869). However, these tests have only little7
Furthermore, we use a simply univariate model GARCH (p,q) model in which the mean
equation includes a constant and an AR(1)-term as is suggested by the autocorrelations in
Table 2 above.
Estimating equation (1) using (2) for a wide range of values for p and q,t h eS c h w a r z
Information Criterion suggests that p=1 and q=1. The results are in Table 3.
4
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However, the assumption that innovations t ε a r eG a u s s i a n ,i sv i o l a t e da n dh e n c ew er e p o r tt h e
quasi-maximum likelihood covariances and standard errors described by Bollerslev and
Wooldridge (1992). The ARCH LM test indicates that there is no autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity up to order 10 in the standardized residuals. An alternative test is the
Ljung-Box Q-statistic of the standardized squared residuals. At the tenth lag Q equals 15.972
indicating that the standardized squared residuals are serially uncorrelated. From these tests
we conclude that the volatility model is adequate. The Wald test does not reject the null of an
integrated GARCH process.
5 This indicates that the volatility process does not return to its
m e a n .S o ,t h em o d e lc a nb eu s e do n l yt od e s c r i b es h o r t - t e r mv o l a t i l i t y .
power if errors are not homogeneous (Kim and Schmidt 1993), or in the presence of structural
breaks (Perron, 1989).
4 It is commonly assumed that the innovations t ε are Gaussian. If this assumption is violated
the usual standard errors are not consistent and the quasi-maximum likelihood covariances
and standard errors described by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) have to be used. The
tables with the estimation results below report these robust standard errors.
5 The estimate for 1 1 ˆ ˆ λ α + in the GARCH model is close to unity, which means that the model
is not covariance stationary (the process is an integrated GARCH process).8
Thus, we find that indeed the variance of the (log-differenced) oil price series is affected
by previous realizations, which implies that high levels of volatility today are expected to
imply that future price uncertainty remains high as well. However, this model assumes that
positive and negative innovations affect the conditional variance similarly. In other words, the
conditional variance is assumed to be a function of just the size and not of the sign of lagged
residuals. To detect whether possible asymmetries exist in the relationship between lagged
residuals and the observed variance as calculated by (1), we use both the TARCH and
EGARCH models discussed above.
Table 4 summarises the results for the asymmetric specifications. The results for the
both the TARCH(1,1) and the EGARCH(1,1) model indicate that the leverage effect term γ is
not significantly positive so there does not appear to be an asymmetric effect.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Thus, the volatility process itself is not asymmetric, and hence equations (1) and (2) seem to
provide the appropriate model. The conditional standard deviation of the GARCH(1,1) model
is plotted in Figure 2.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
However, the effect of volatility on economic performance can be asymmetric as is argued in
the introduction. To show the impact of volatility of oil prices on economic activity, we need
to construct models of economic activity. The data for these models are annual data, which
implies that the monthly volatility measure derived here needs to be aggregated to reflect
annual volatility.9
5. Measure of uncertainty
The GARCH models using monthly in the previous sections generate conditional standard
deviations for the corresponding time spans. To obtain a measure of uncertainty experienced
during a specific year, we use the within-year high-low range of the conditional standard
deviations in that particular year (see also Bollerslev et al., 1994, p. 3012). It is likely that the
higher the uncertainty, the higher the high-low range within a year will be. The within-year
high-low range is calculated as
[] [] t t t t t t t V , Dec, ; Jan, , Dec, ; Jan, min max range τ τ τ τ σ σ
∈ ∈ − ≡ (5)
where t , τ σ is the conditional standard deviation for month τ in year t.T h i ss e r i e si sp l o t t e di n
Figure 3.
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What we observe in Figure 3 is that uncertainty has been extremely high in the years 1973-
1974 (the oil embargo). After the oil embargo in 1973-1974 uncertainty dropped to low levels
until the mid 1980s. Since 1995 uncertainty seems to increase. Volatility peaked in 1974,
1986, 1990, 1994, 1999 and at the start of the 21
th century. The causes, both political and
economic, are in Appendix A.
More interesting is the question how uncertainty affects the economy. Basically, we
expect firms to postpone investment if they are uncertain; firms keep their options open. The
reason is that uncertainty today influences expectations about the future. A related question is
whether these responses are the same in magnitude if oil prices are high or low. These
questions will be addressed in the next section.10
6. Asymmetric effects of uncertainty on the use of energy
We have compiled a data set consisting of 15 countries with 9 sectors each for the period
1978-1997. Appendix B gives some more detail. The uncertainty measure for the longest time
span from the previous section is included in simple models. The first model relates energy
use (E) to the price of energy (P
E) and output (Y). It is a short-run energy demand equation
including the price of energy and output:
A A
E
A A Y d P d E d ε δ β α + + + = ) log( ) log( ) log( ,( 6 )
where subscript A denotes that the coefficients are specific to the regression that aims to
determine the (log of the) absolute level of energy use.
The second model focuses in energy-intensity of production and relates the energy-
labour ratio (E/L) to the relative price of energy to labour (P
E/W):
R
E
R R W P d L E d ε β α + + = ) / log( ) / log( ,( 7 )
where subscript R indicates that the coefficients are specific to the regression that aims to
determine the (log of the) level of energy use relative to labor input. The idea behind this
model is that entrepreneurs, in the long run, decide to adjust the energy intensity of
production if the price of energy relative to the wage rate changes.
We extend these models to include (i) oil price uncertainty, and (ii) possible
asymmetries with respect to oil price changes. Appendix B shows that the standard deviation
of energy price changes dominates the standard deviation of nominal wage rates. This is why
we do not include uncertainty surrounding nominal wage rates. Asymmetry works directly11
through prices and via uncertainty. To allow for uncertainty and asymmetry, we adjust models
(6) and (7) as follows.
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In model (8), the price elasticity of energy use is
min). max ( ) ) log sgn( ( ) log sgn( V V P d P d A
E
A A
E
A − + + + λ γ β µ (10)
In model (9), the substitution elasticity is
min). max ( ) ) / log sgn( ( ) / log sgn( V V W P d W P d R
E
R R
E
R − + + + λ γ β µ (11)
These specifications provide full flexibility with respect to decomposing the impact of energy
price changes into asymmetric components, where the actual extent of the impact is allowed
to differ depending on the amount of uncertainty the industry is confronted with.
Unfortunately, multicollinearity between the percentage change in the energy price and the
uncertainty measure force us to choose between two, more restricted, specifications; one in
which the coefficients j β and j γ (j=A,R) are set equal to zero, and one in which j µ and j λ
are set equal to zero. These two restricted models will be referred to with indices i and ii,
respectively. We let the fit determine which model we prefer.
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From Tables 5 and 6 we draw a number of conclusions: First, both Tables 5 and 6 reveal
significant effects of uncertainty as evidenced by the coefficients on the (interacted)
uncertainty measure. Second, our preferred Model 8-ii (see Table 5) shows that there is
evidence of asymmetric effects of uncertainty. Uncertainty moderates the effects of increasing
energy prices on energy use as compared to the effect of falling energy prices on the use of
energy. If the price of energy increases, the use of energy increases by
min) max ( 68 . 0 17 . 0 V V − + − , which is less than zero; an increase in the price of energy does
result in a decrease in energy consumed, but this decrease is smaller the more uncertainty a
sector faces. On the other hand, if the price of energy decreases, energy use increases by
min). max ( 68 . 0 17 . 0 V V − +
Finally, model 9-ii (see Table 6) shows that there is also evidence of an asymmetric
impact of uncertainty on the ratio of energy use to labor use. Again, uncertainty moderates the
effects of increasing energy prices relative to the wage rate on the energy-labour ratio, as
compared to the effect of falling energy prices relative to the wage rate on the energy-labour
ratio. If the price of energy relative to the wage rate increases, the energy-labour ratio
increases by min) max ( 76 . 0 22 . 0 V V − + − , which is smaller than zero; an increase in the
relative price of energy does result in a decrease in energy intensity of production, but this
decrease is smaller the more uncertainty a sector faces. On the other hand, if the price of
energy relative to the wage rate decreases, the energy-labour ratio increases by
min). max ( 76 . 0 22 . 0 V V − +
Therefore, we find that the absolute and relative amount of energy used is less
responsive to (relative) energy price increases the higher the uncertainty a sector faces.
6 This
6 To check the robustness of our results, we have tested whether the big spikes in our measure
of uncertainty (see the years 1986, 1990, 1994 in Figure 3) are responsible for the results13
is consistent with theory, which predicts that the investments needed to achieve a decrease in
energy use, are likely to respond more sluggishly to (relative) price changes the more likely it
is that price change reversals occur. However, this effect is not present when considering the
response to energy price decreases, as relaxing the constraints on the use of energy do not
necessarily require the adoption of new technologies.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we try to understand the nature of dependence of the conditional variance on past
volatility in oil prices. Time-varying conditional variances are estimated using univariate
GARCH models. We focus on volatility on the monthly refiner acquisition cost of imported
crude oil (US$ per barrel) over period January, 1970 to April, 2002. The preferred model is a
symmetric GARCH(1,1) model.
The measure of uncertainty we present is the within-year high-low range of the
conditional standard deviation. In the second part of this paper, we try to understand the role
of uncertainty in the investment decision. We test this measure of uncertainty in simple
models of energy use allowing for asymmetry. We focus on the price elasticity of energy use
and the elasticity of substitution between energy and labour.
We arrive at two major conclusions. First, uncertainty plays a role only through the
asymmetric effect of changing prices. Uncertainty enhances asymmetry as it moderates the
effects of increasing energy prices and strengthens the effect of falling energy prices. Second,
on average, the effects on energy use and energy intensity are larger if energy prices drop, in
line with previous research.
obtained above. Including time dummies in the regressions, which are not shown here, shows
that the estimates are very robust: uncertainty remains highly significant and the estimates are
the same.14
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Appendix A: Oil Price Chronologies: 1970 – 2001
The oil price series used in this paper is refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil (US$
per barrel) available on a monthly basis from the Energy Information Administration
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/chron.html). This series is plotted in Figure A1.
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The appendix lists some factors that have influenced world oil markets and the oil price. An
extensive chronology was originally published by the Department of Energy's Office of the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Analysis Division. Updates for 1995-2001 are from the Energy
Information Administration (source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/chron.html). Here we
give a short summary.
1973-1974
•  Oil embargo begins (October 19-20, 1973)
•  Oil embargo ends (March 18, 1974)
1979-1982
•  Iranian revolution; Shah deposed (January 16, 1979)
•  OPEC raises prices 14.5% (April 1, 1979)
•  OPEC again raises prices 15% (July 1, 1979)
•  Iran takes hostages (November 4, 1979); President Carter halts imports from Iran
(November 12, 1979)
•  Saudis raise marker crude price from 19$/bbl to 26$/bbl (December 13, 1979)
•  Kuwait, Iran, and Libya production cuts drop OPEC oil production to 27 million b/d ()19
•  Saudi Light raised to $28/bbl (April 1, 1980), Saudi Light raised to $34/bbl (December
1980)
•  First major fighting in Iran-Iraq War (September 23, 1990)
•  Libya initiates discounts
•  OPEC cuts prices by $5/bbl and agrees to 17.5 million b/d outpuT (1983)
•  Norway, United Kingdom, and Nigeria cut prices (October 1984)
•  OPEC accord cuts Saudi Light price to $28/bbl (January 1985)
1990-1991
•  Iraq invades Kuwait (August, 2 1990)
•  Operation Desert Storm begins (January 16, 1991)
•  Persian Gulf war ends (February 28, 1991)
1996-2001
•  U.S. launches cruise missile attacks into southern Iraq following an Iraqi-supported
invasion of Kurdish safe haven areas in northern Iraq (September 5, 1996).
•  Prices rise as Iraq's refusal to allow United Nations weapons inspectors into "sensitive"
sites raises tensions in the oil-rich Middle East (November 20, 1997).
•  OPEC raises its production ceiling (November 29, 1997). This is the first increase in 4
years.
•  World oil supply increases by 2.25 million barrels per day in 1997, the largest annual
increase since 1988.
•  In 1998 oil prices continue to plummet as increased production from Iraq coincides with
no growth in Asian oil demand due to the Asian economic crisis and increases in world oil
inventories following two unusually warm winters.20
•  Oil prices triple between January 1999 and September 2000 due to strong world oil
demand, OPEC oil production cutbacks, and other factors, including weather and low oil
stock levels.
•  Oil prices fall due to weak world demand (largely as a result of economic recession in the
United States) and OPEC overproduction.
•  Oil prices decline sharply following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, largely on increased fears of a sharper worldwide economic downturn (and
therefore sharply lower oil demand).21
Appendix B: OECD data set
The data used in this paper are derived from the IEA Energy Balances and from the OECD
International Sectoral Data Base. Employment is measured is in millions of man years; the
wage rates are annual wages in thousands of 1990 U.S. dollars. Capital is in billions of 1990
dollars; the rental price of capital is calculated using nominal interest rates (government bond
rate) and industry-specific deflators and rates of depreciation. Energy is in millions of tons of
oil equivalents, and its price is in millions of 1990 U.S. dollars per ton of oil equivalents.
Output is also in billions of 1990 U.S. dollars. Currency conversion has been applied by using
country- and industry-specific deflators and 1990 Purchasing Power Parities.
INSERT TABLE B1 ABOUT HERE
Time span: 1978-1997
Frequency: annual
Variables:
Y: Output (1990 US-prices)
K: Capital stock (1990 US-prices)
EC: Energy consumption (metric tons oil equivalent)
TE: Total employment (manyears)
R: Rental price of capital (1990 US-prices)
EP: Energy price (1990 US-prices)
WR: Wage rate (1990 US-prices)22
COD: Output price (1990 US-prices)
9s e c t o r s :
FOD: Food, beverages and tobacco
TEX: Textile, wearing apparel and leather industries
WOD: Wood and wood products, incl. furniture
PAP: Paper and paper products, printing and publishing
MNM: Non-metallic mineral products except products of petroleum and coal
BMI: Basis metal industries
BMA: Metal products, except machinery and transport equipment
MTR: Transport equipment
CST: Construction
15 countries:
AUS: Australia
BEL: Belgium
CAN: Canada
DEU: Germany
DNK: Denmark
FIN: Finland
FRA: France
GBR: United Kingdom
ITA: Italy
JPN: Japan
NLD: Netherlands23
NOR: Norway
SWE: Sweden
USA: United States of America
WGR: Western Germany
Sources:
OECD International sectoral data base (ISDB)
OECD Structural analysis database (STAN)
Energy Balances
And own calculations24
Table 1. Log-differenced monthly refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil (US$ per
barrel), summary statistics
Mean -0.001547
Standard Deviation 0.106620
Skewness -0.205274
Kurtosis 7.63949425
Table 2. Autocorrelations of the level of log-differenced monthly refiner acquisition cost of
imported crude oil (US$ per barrel), and the squared monthly log-differenced monthly refiner
acquisition cost of imported crude oil (US$ per barrel)
Lags Level Squared
1 0.291 0.046
2 0.136 0.073
3 0.165 0.245
4 -0.049 0.003
5 -0.083 -0.002
6 -0.097 -0.005
7 0.002 -0.014
8 0.051 -0.016
9 0.010 -0.018
10 0.069 -0.009
Bold: significantly different from
zero at (approximately) the 5%
significance level.26
Table 3. GARCH(1,1) model results, January, 1970 to April, 2002
Coefficient Robust standard error
Mean equation
Constant 0.009307 0.005646
AR(1) 0.458043 0.065643
Variance equation
0 α ,C o n s t a n t 0.001114 0.000883
1 α , ARCH(1) 0.444508 0.227377
1 λ , GARCH(1) 0.445987 0.128830
Observations 386
Diagnostics Statistic Probability
ARCH LM (10 lags) 16.09031 0.097076
Q( 1 0
th lag) 16.557 0.056
Wald: 1 ˆ ˆ 1 1 = + λ α 0.179971 0.67139827
Table 4. Asymmetric ARCH model results, January, 1970 to April, 2002
TARCH(1,1) EGARCH(1,1)
Coefficient Robust
standard error
Coefficient Robust
standard error
Mean equation
Constant 0.009779 0.006392 0.017769 0.012098
AR(1) 0.448800 0.061976 0.414473 0.067404
Variance equation
0 α ,C o n s t a n t 0.001120 0.000874 0.012098 1.009375
1 α , ARCH(1) 0.480723 0.320316 0.067404 0.133333
γ , Leverage -0.099249 0.376545 0.012098 0.145310
1 λ , GARCH(1) 0.450634 0.129938 0.067404 0.189762
Observations 386 386
Diagnostics Statistic Probability Statistic Probability
ARCH LM (10 lags) 15.11149 0.128050 3.657508 0.961478
Q( 1 0
th lag) 16.208 0.063 13.607 0.137
Wald: 1 ˆ ˆ 1 1 = + λ α 0.037072 0.847319 2.317313 0.12794128
Table 5. Estimation results, asymmetric models including volatility, 1979-1996
Model 8-i Model 8-ii
Cross-sections 107 107
Observations 1783 1783
Dep.Variable ) log(E d ) log(E d
Variables Coeff. White se Coeff. White se
Constant -0.0102 0.0025 -0.0067 0.0011
) log(
E P d 0.0733 0.0295
) log(
E P d -0.1704 0.0185
) log( min) max (
E P d V V × − 0.7824 0.2112
) log( min) max (
E P d V V × − -0.8986 0.1565
) log(Y d 0.3866 0.0146 0.3696 0.0159
Unweighted statistics
Adj-R
2 0.0423 0.0872
DW 2.2969 2.3078
S.E. 0.1848 0.180329
Table 6. Estimation results, asymmetric models including volatility, 1979-1996
Model 9-i Model 9-ii
Cross-sections 107 107
Observations 1624 1624
Dep.Variable ) / log( L E d ) / log( L E d
Variables Coeff. White se Coeff. White se
Constant 0.0029 0.0028 0.0079 0.0015
) / log( W P d
E 0.1146 0.0291
) / log( W P d
E -0.2203 0.0177
) / log( min) max ( W P d V V
E × − 0.8613 0.2313
) / log( min) max ( W P d V V
E × − -1.3225 0.1568
Unweighted statistics
Adj-R
2 0.0501 0.1119
DW 2.2632 2.2711
S.E. 0.1808 0.174830
Table B1. Summary statistics, all cross-sections
log-differences
EC TE K Y EP WR R COD
Mean 0.004 -0.015 0.021 0.007 0.005 0.017 -0.013 0.044
Sum 9.247 -27.088 35.421 13.446 10.752 29.023 -18.947 80.258
Median 0.004 -0.010 0.019 0.012 -0.003 0.017 -0.004 0.039
Maximum 2.288 0.336 0.559 0.248 0.500 0.495 1.632 0.384
Minimum -2.292 -0.379 -0.306 -0.295 -1.519 -0.384 -4.808 -0.440
Sum Sq. Dev. 79.530 4.627 2.533 7.211 51.285 7.511 133.085 11.252
Std. Dev. 0.181 0.048 0.033 0.062 0.147 0.065 0.298 0.065
Skewness 2.438 -0.444 3.437 -0.473 -1.319 0.393 -8.263 0.021
Kurtosis 60.976 8.907 62.155 5.185 13.238 9.093 112.334 7.761
Jarque-Bera 340902 2777 245302 440 10982 2641 760627 1734
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 2417 1868 1660 1864 2358 1679 1493 1836
Cross-
sections
133 114 103 107 134 107 95 10731
Figure 1. Monthly log-differenced the price of Brent crude (US$ per barrel)
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Figure 2. GARCH(1,1) conditional standard deviation33
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Figure 3. Volatility: witin-year high-low ranges34
Figure A1. Monthly refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil (US$ per barrel)
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